Abstract. Structural non-interference is a semi-static technique defined over Petri nets to check the absence of illegal information flows. This paper presents the main algorithmic features of this new technique and its implementation in a software tool, called the Petri Net Security Checker.
Introduction
Non-interference has been defined in the literature as an extensional property based on some observational semantics: the high part of a system does not interfere with the low part if whatever is done at the high level produces no visible effect on the low part of the system. The original notion of non-interference in [10] was defined, using trace semantics, for system programs that are deterministic. Generalized notions of non-interference were then designed to include (nondeterministic) labeled transition systems and finer notions of observational semantics such as bisimulation (see, e.g., [14, 6, 13, 15, 8] ). The security properties in this class are based on the dynamics of systems; they are defined by means of one (or more) equivalence check(s); hence, non-interference checking is as difficult as equivalence checking, a well-studied hard problem in concurrency theory.
One relevant property in this class is the bisimulation-based property BNDC (Bisimulation Non-Deducibility on Composition) proposed by Focardi and Gorrieri some years ago [6, 8] on a CCS-like [12] process algebra. BNDC basically states that a system R is secure if it is bisimilar to R in parallel with any high level process Π w.r.t. the low actions the two systems can perform.
Intuitively, the many definitions of non-interference that have been proposed try to capture the essence of information flow as an extensional property. On the contrary, one may think that there are clear physical reasons for the occurrence of an information flow, that can be better understood if one exploits a computational model where causality of actions and conflict among actions can be modelled directly. Indeed, this is not the case of labeled transitions systems, a typical example of an interleaving model, where parallelism is not primitive.
For this reason, in [1] [2] [3] Busi and Gorrieri have shown that these extensional non-interference properties can be naturally defined also on Petri Nets, in particular on Elementary Nets [5] , a well-known model of computation where causality and conflict are primitive concepts. More interestingly, they address the problem of defining statically non-interference for Elementary Nets, by looking at the structure of the net systems under investigation:
• in order to better understand the relationship between a flow of information and the causality (or conflict) relation between the activities originating such a flow, hence grounding more firmly the intuition about what is an interference, and • in order to find more efficiently checkable non-interference properties that are sufficient (sometimes also necessary) conditions for those that have already received some support in the literature, such as BNDC.
Structural non-interference is defined on the basis of the absence of particular places in the net. We identify two special classes of places: causal places, i.e., places for which there are an incoming high transition and an outgoing low transition; and, conflict places, i.e. places for which there are both low and high outgoing transitions. Intuitively, causal places represent potential source of interference because the occurrence of the high transition is a prerequisite for the execution of the low transition. Similarly, conflict places represent potential source of interference because if the low event is not executable, then we can derive that a certain high transition has occurred. The absence of causal and conflict places is clearly a static property that can be easily checked by a simple inspection of the (finite) net structure; interestingly enough, this is a sufficient condition to ensure BNDC.
In order to characterize more precisely BNDC, the notion of causal place and conflict place is slightly refined, yielding the so-called active causal place and active conflict place. These new definitions are based also on a limited exploration of the state-space of the net (i.e. of its marking graph), hence, the absence of such places is not a purely structural property, rather a hybrid property. When active causal and active conflict places are absent, we get a property, called Positive Place-Based Non-Interference (PBNI+ for short), which turns out to be equivalent to BNDC (proof in [3] ). This result is rather surprising because the two properties are defined in a very different way.
Contribution of this paper
In this paper, we investigate the algorithmic properties of PBNI+. First we show that, given an elementary net with p places, n transitions and f arcs, the complexity of checking for the absence of potential causal/conflict places is O(f + p). Then, once singled out potential causal/conflict places, the check that such a potential place is active takes O(pn2 3p ) in the worst case, because it is necessary to build the whole marking graph (that is exponential in the size of the net). Therefore, depending on the shape of the net, the complexity of PBNI+ varies in the range between O(f + p) and O(pn2 3p ). It is interesting to observe that BNDC was proved to be decidable in [11] over labeled transitions systems with an algorithm that is exponential in the number of the states. Even if the two models are different and so a comparison may be unfair, we point out that our procedure for deciding BNDC is cubic in the number of states of the marking graph of the net, which in turn is exponential in the number of the places of the net.
These algorithms have been implemented in a software tool, called the Petri Net Security Checker (PNSC for short), which provides functionalities for creating, editing and executing Petri nets, as well as automatically detecting places that are potential/active and causal/conflict.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we recall the basic definitions about Elementary Net systems, the dynamic non-interference property BNDC and the structural property PBNI+. In Section 3 we discuss the complexity of checking PBNI+. In Section 4 we describe the details of the PNSC tool, its functionalities and its implementation, besides showing its application to a small case study. Finally, some conclusive remarks are drawn in Section 5.
Background

Elementary Net Systems
Here we introduce basic definitions about the class of Petri Nets we use. Some familiarity with Petri net terminology is assumed. More details in [5, 2] . A subset of S is called a marking. Given a marking m and a place s, if s ∈ m then we say that the place s contains a token, otherwise we say that s is empty.
Let x ∈ S ∪ T . The preset of x is the set The set of firing sequences is defined inductively as follows:
• m 0 is a firing sequence;
We use σ to range over transition sequences.
The marking graph of a net system N is the transition system
A net is transition simple if the following condition holds for all x, y ∈ T : if
marking m contains a contact if there exists a transition t ∈ T such that
• t ⊆ m and not(m[t ). A net system is contactfree if no marking in [m 0 contains a contact. A net system is reduced if each transition can occur at least one time: for all t ∈ T there exists m ∈ [m 0 such that m[t . In the following we consider contact-free elementary net systems that are transition simple and reduced.
A Dynamic Non-interference Property: BNDC
Our aim is to analyse systems that can perform two kinds of actions: high level actions, representing the interaction of the system with high level users, and low level actions, representing the interaction with low level users. We want to verify if the interplay between the high user and the high part of the system can affect the view of the system as observed by a low user. We assume that the low user knows the structure of the system, and we check if, in spite of this, he is not able to infer the behavior of the high user by observing the low view of the execution of the system. Hence, we consider nets whose set of transitions is partitioned into two subsets: the set H of high level transitions and the set L of low level transitions. To emphasize this partition we use the following notation. Let L and H be two disjoint sets: with (S, L, H, F, m 0 ) we denote the net system (S, L ∪ H, F, m 0 ).
Among the many non-interference properties defined by Focardi and Gorrieri in [6] [7] [8] , here we consider BNDC (Bisimulation Non-Deducibility on Composition). To properly define it over Petri nets, we need some auxiliary definitions: the operations of parallel composition (in TCSP-like style [4] ) and restriction (in CCS-like style [12] ), as well as a notion of low-view bisimulation.
Note that synchronization occurs over those (low or high) transitions that are shared by the two nets, i.e., a transition t that occurs both in N 1 and N 2 has preset (postset), in N 1 | N 2 , given by the union of the disjoint presets (postsets) in N 1 and N 2 , respectively.
Definition 4. Let N = (S, L, H, F, m 0 ) be a net system and let U be a set of transitions. The restriction on U is defined as
The non-interference property we are going to introduce is based on some notion of low observability of a system, i.e., what can be observed of a system from the point of view of low users. The low view of a transition sequence is nothing but the subsequence where high level transitions are discarded. 
Then, a variant of bisimulation [12] can be defined in such a way that only the low behaviour is considered.
We say that N 1 is low-view bisimilar to N 2 , denoted by
Now we are ready to define BNDC.
The left-hand term N \H represents the system N when isolated from highlevel users (hence, the low view of N in isolation), while the right-hand term expresses the low view of N interacting with the (common transitions of the) high environment K (note that the activities resulting from such interactions are invisible by the definition of low view equivalence). BNDC is a very intuitive property: whatever high level system K is interacting with N , the low effect is unobservable. However, it is difficult to check this property because of the universal quantification over high systems. Fig. 1 . The net system for a mutually exclusive access to a shared resource.
Example 1. As a simple case study and running example, consider the net in Figure 1 , which represents a mutually exclusive access to a shared resource (represented by the token in s) by a high-user (left part of the net) and a low-user (right part of the net). Even if it might appear, at first sight, that the system is secure (and indeed, it is BSNNI (Bisimulation Strong Nondeterministic NonInterference) [8] ), actually it is not secure because a low level user can detect if a high-level user has deadlocked the system. Indeed, if the high-level user represented in the net K in Figure 2 wants to interact with the user in Figure 1 , then a deadlock is reached after performing the sequence h 1 h 2 and the low level user can detect this because (s)he is not able to interact with the net. As a matter of fact, BN DC is not satisfied, as K makes invalid the equivalence check in the definition of BN DC. Fig. 2 . The shared resource net system is not BNDC.
Structural Non-interference
Consider a net system N = (S, L, H, F, m 0 ). Consider a low level transition l of the net: if l can fire, then we know that the places in the preset of l are marked before the firing of l; moreover, we know that such places become unmarked after the firing of l. If there exists a high level transition h that produces a token in a place s in the preset of l (see the system N 1 in Figure 3) , then the low level user can infer that h has occurred if he can perform the low level transition l. We note that there exists a causal dependency between the transitions h and l, because the firing of h produces a token that is consumed by l. In this case we will say s is a potential causal place. Consider now the situation illustrated in the system N 2 of Figure 3 : in this case, place s is in the preset of both l and h, i.e., l and h are competing for the use of the resource represented by the token in s. Aware of the existence of such a place, a low user knows that the high-level action h has been performed, if he is not able to perform the low-level action l. Place s represents a conflict between transitions l and h, because the firing of h prevents l from firing. In this case we will call s a potential conflict place.
In order to avoid the definition of a security notion that is too strong, and that rules out systems that do not reveal information on the high-level actions that have been performed, we need to refine the concepts illustrated above. In particular the potential causal place is an active causal place if there is an execution where the token produced by the high level transition is eventually consumed by the low level transition. Similarly, a potential conflict place is active if the token that could be consumed immediately by a high level transition can be later on also consumed by a low level transition. The formal definitions follow.
Definition 8. Let N = (S, L, H, F, m 0 ) be an elementary net system. Let s be a place of
N such that s • ∩ L = ∅ (i.e.,
a token in s can be consumed by a low transition).
The place s ∈ S is a potentially causal place if
a token in s can be produced by a high transition). A potentially causal place s is an active causal place if the following condition holds: there exist
l ∈ s • ∩ L, h ∈ • s ∩ H, m ∈ [m 0
and a transition sequence σ such that m[hσl and s ∈ t
• for all t ∈ σ.
The place s ∈ S is a potentially conflict place if s • ∩ H = ∅ (i.e., the token in s can be consumed also by a high transition). A potentially conflict place is an active conflict place if the following condition holds: there exist
l ∈ s • ∩ L, h ∈ s • ∩ H, m ∈ [m 0
and a transition sequence σ such that m[h , m[σl and s ∈ t
Definition 9. Let N = (S, L, H, F, m 0 ) be an elementary net system. We say that N is PBNI+ (positive Place Based Non-Interference) if, for all s ∈ S, s is neither an active causal place nor an active conflict place.
The following non-trivial result, proved in [3] , states that the behavioural non-interference property BNDC is equivalent to the semi-static, structural property PBNI+.
Theorem 1. Let N = (S, L, H, F, m 0 ) be an elementary net system. Then N is PBNI+ iff N is BNDC.
An obvious consequence is that if N has no potentially causal and potentially conflict places, then N is BNDC. Hence, a simple strategy to check if N is BNDC is to first identify potential causal/conflict places, a procedure that we show in the next section to be of complexity O(f + p) in the size of the net (p is the number of places and f of arcs). If no place of these sorts is found, then N is PBNI+, hence BNDC. Otherwise, any such a candidate place should be better studied to check if it is actually an active causal/conflict place, a procedure that requires a limited exploration of the marking graph.
Observe that the net in Figure 1 of our running example is not PBNI+ because place s is an active conflict (and also active causal) place.
PBNI+ verification algorithms
Verification of PBNI+ requires two separate steps: first, detection of potential causal places and potential conflict ones; then, checking if such places are active (causal/conflict) places.
We assume to use certain data structures. Precisely, a N et will be a structure containing an ordered list of places, an ordered list of transitions and a list of places (subset of the above mentioned places list) representing the initial marking. We also assume places in the initial marking list maintain the same order they have in the places list, so that all operations on sets of places (such as union, intersection and difference) can be done in O(p).
Each place (each transition) has associated its own preset and postset, that are represented by lists of the opposite elements (transitions or places, respectively). As for the initial marking list in a N et, we will assume the nodes in the preset and postset lists appear in the same order they do in the lists they are taken from, so to be able to perform all operations on sets in linear time w.r.t. the number of nodes (O(p) or O(n), respectively). For convenience, we will assume a N et also contains a list of arcs (as specified by the flow relation F , |F | = f ), thus that we can occasionally cycle on it in O(f ) time rather than O(np) (inherent upper bound for f ).
Potential places detection
Detecting potential places is a purely structural procedure, easy and computationally light-weight. Let us consider detection of potential causal places in a net N with p places and f arcs, and each place has three dedicated boolean variables for keeping track of the examined arcs: highP re, lowP ost and highP ost. This consists of the following steps (each one annotated with an estimate of its worst-case computational cost):
• for each arc a in the net N : Detection of potential conflict places differs slightly, in that it will only set highP ost instead of highP re. As all inner instructions cost O(1), the final procedure cost will be the sum of the two cycles, namely O(f + p).
Active places detection
Differently from the above, detection of active places is a complex (hence, also heavier) procedure because it has to analyze -though partially -the dynamic behaviour of the net.
First of all, we need a procedure to build the marking graph, i.e., the state space of the net.
1 We represent such a graph as a list of structures. Each of these structures is composed of a marking m, (where each marking is a set of places represented in the same fashion as the initial marking in N et), and of a list of pairs (t, m ), where t is an enabled transition and m is the marking reached by firing t, i.e., m[t m .
Under these modelling assumptions, the algorithm is composed of the following instructions (each annotated with an estimate of its worst-case, computational cost):
• create the marking list list with the initial marking as its only element -
The procedure acts mostly as a breadth-first visit: we add first the initial marking, and start a cycle exploring the graph. For each marking in the list, we compute the marking every enabled transition leads to and add the corresponding pair (enabled transition, reached marking) to the currently examined marking. When we meet a new marking, we add it to the queue and this will be examined later as the cycle proceeds.
Since the heaviest operation in the innermost cycle is checking whether the marking graph already contains a marking (O(2 p )), the procedure's cost is bound to the product of this by the weight of the nested cycles over the places and transitions of the net. Therefore the procedure's final cost will be O(n2 2p ) 2 . Notice also that this procedure can take any marking as initial marking, which means that it can compute every possible subgraph rooted in the given marking. Furthermore, also a procedure for creating a marking graph restricted on a set of transitions can be easily obtained from the above. It is easy to see this trivially involves including only one more check and does not change computational costs.
1 Notice that, since each marking is a set of places, the marking graph can contain up to 2 p states. Hence, the state space we are dealing with is inherently exponential in the number p of places. 2 A further optimization could be using a search tree instead of a list for representing the marking graph, once an appropriate order on the places is introduced such that induces an order on the markings as well. We can now introduce a procedure that searches for active causal places over the net. Intuitively, we do the following steps:
• Note, moreover, that in practice, the cost of checking PBNI+ is much lower: (i) it might be the case that there are no potential causal/conflict places and so in this case the complexity is O(f + p); (ii) the number of potential places is usually small w.r.t. to p; and, in particular, (iii) the number of reachable markings of the marking graph is generally much lower than 2 p .
Petri Net Security Checker
The tool, named P etri N et Security Checker (P N SC for short) [9] , was written in Java [16] , using the Eclipse development platform [17] . Figure 4 shows the tool's interface, which provides the user, in a single working environment, with different functionalities, that can be grouped into three main categories: editing, execution and net properties checking. By means of an intuitive toolbar, the user can draw the net. This includes basic operations as drawing places and (both high and low) transitions, draw arcs between them and set the initial marking of the net. Furthermore, it is possible to select portions of the net to carry out further operations as deleting, cutting, copying and pasting. Being designed for incremental editing of nets in conjunction with checking their security, we developed different view modes to make comparison easier. In fact, nets can be cloned and placed side by side to be edited and compared concurrently, as shown in Figure 5 .
Editing
In addition, the tool keeps track of all editing steps, so that each one can be undone/redone.
Execution
It is also possible to graphically simulate net executions (commonly referred to as token game animation).
The user can either fire one of the currently enabled transitions (highlighted in green as in Figure 4 and in Figure 5 ) by double clicking on it, or he can start a timed random execution, which consists of firing, at regular time intervals, a random transition among the enabled ones. In this case also, the tool keeps track of all firing steps, so that it is possible to step back (and, afterwards, forward) to previous (respectively, following) markings. 
Properties check
Finally, the most distinctive functionalities of P N SC pertain to the verification of the net's properties.
First, it is possible to check whether a net is simple, reduced and contact free 3 . Whenever one of these does not hold, all nodes that do not comply with it are highlighted in grey (as in Figure 6 ). The main functionality of our tool though is finding both potential and active causal/conflict places in the net, using the algorithms described in Section 3. When these checks are activated, potential causal/conflict places will be highlighted in orange, while active causal/conflict ones will be highlighted in red, as shown in Figure 7 , which depicts the net already discussed in Figure 1 . Fig. 7 . Potential causal/conflict places will be highlighted in orange, active ones in red Furthermore, for each potential/active place found it is possible to pinpoint and highlight the transitions and markings involved in the causality or conflict situation from the rest of the net, as in Figure 8 , allowing a better inspection of the problem. 
Conclusion
In this paper we presented the tool P etri N et Security Checker for building Petri nets with transitions of two different confidentiality levels and check a structural security property on them, namely PBNI+.
The tool can actually check also some behavioural security properties, such as SBNDC and BSNNI [2] . Interestingly enough, PBNI+ is proved to be equivalent to the behavioural property BNDC which is not obviously decidable; hence, the algorithms we presented in Section 3 offer a decidability proof for BNDC over Elementary Net Systems. The only paper we know offering a decidability result for BNDC is [11] where an exponential (in the number of states) procedure is presented for labeled transition systems. Our result is actually for a rather different model (unlabeled elementary net systems) and so it might be unfair to make a comparison; nonetheless, our decision procedure is cubic in the number of states of the marking graph (in turn exponential in the number of places).
We considered, for theoretical reasons in the implementation of our tool, only Elementary N et Systems, where places can contain at most one token. A natural generalization of this approach is to consider Place/Transition systems, where each place can contain more than one token. Such a class of nets is particularly interesting because the marking graph associated to a finite P/T net system may be infinite. In [3] Busi and Gorrieri claim that PBNI+ can be easily defined also on this richer class of nets and checked in a finite amount of time, and keep on being the same as BNDC and SBNDC also for P/T net systems. This is particularly interesting because bisimulation is not decidable over P/T nets, hence BNDC as well as SBNDC are not checkable at all! This extension would also possibly provide the first result of decidability of a behavioural information flow security property, like BNDC, on a class of infinite state systems. It is likely that an extension of PBNI+ to cover P/T nets also could be easily followed by a corresponding extension of the tool.
